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Why the Taint to Religion?:
The Interplay of Chance and Reason
Richard Stith*
As usual, Professor Durham has offered a profound and
careful analysis of the treatment of religion i n American
society.' I want t o ask more about why an epistemological
privileging of a secular outlook, a tainting of a religious
outlook, exists in the United States. Professor Durham cited
the creation science cases as excluding plausible theories of
biogenesis which betray a religious o r i g h 2 The phenomenon of
exclusion of religion is, however, quite general. There is a taint
to religious values, symbols, and organizations whenever they
appear in public. Our courts insist that religion can have no
public role as part of a state agency o r of a private group
backed by extensive state inv~lvement.~The result, as
Professor Durham points out, is that on the one hand religious
people feel marginalized and ignored; on the other hand, the
whole community is deprived of a resource for implementing
public programs that require or instill virtue.4 The demise of
religious schools, for example, would be bad from many secular
points of view, yet such schools can receive no public support,
even for essential public purposes.
My question is this: Is the taint that we have lived with in
this country-growing out of the Establishment Clause-
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hofessor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. Copyright 1993 by
Richard Stith. AU rights resewed. This article was written in response to that of
Professor Cole Durham, infra note 1, for the meeting of the International Legal
Science Association, Provo, Utah, Sept. 10-13, 1992.
1. See W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism,
and the Transformative Dimension of Religious Institutions, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV.
421.
2.
See id. at 44-45; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 US. 97 (1968).
3. See Larkin v. GrendePs Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
4.
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US. 602 (1971).
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accidental t o our history, o r does it have a rational basis? This
question is important because it affects the kind of advice or
example that we can give to nations that are developing or
reformulating their constitutions. If the values in our
Establishment Clause are merely the result of chance historical
events, other nations should be able to find alternatives to our
constitutional principles. But if the values i n our
Establishment Clause are fundamental to modern society,
perhaps they should be everywhere promulgated.

Let me give some examples and reasons why it sometimes
appears to me that our situation is accidental. We struggle t o
keep American public schools free of religion, but the Federal
Republic of Germany, a nation with high ideals of individual
equality and freedom, lives peacefully with religion being
taught in the public schools. This religious presence does not
seem to be significantly controversial among Germans. Why
does religion in schools raise such bright red flags for
Americans? Why should this upset us so much, when it does
not upset the Germans?
Another source of possibly unnecessary tension between
church and state is the U.S. federal income tax code. Professor
Durham did not discuss the code in his paper, although it may
be even more important than the Establishment Clause, or
Employment Division v. Smith,' in limiting freedom of religion.
No religious group that receives a tax exemption, or whose
donors get tax deductions, can be involved in elections6 This
tremendously inhibits religious groups from participating in
public life. Yet it is my understanding that these sections of the
tax code were in part ad hoe measures intended to strike back
at a private nonreligious foundation which had dared t o
support a n opponent of Senator Lyndon B. J ~ h n s o n .The
~
provisions did not express some deliberate, well-thought-out
principle meant to place a vise around religious activity. By
accident, as it were, the tax code has imposed major limitations
on religious freedom.

5. 494 U.S.872 (1990);see also Durham & Dushku, supra note 1, at 447-55.
6. See I.R.C. $8 501(c)(3), 170(c)(2) (1988).
7. Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., On Not Rendering to Caesar The
Unconstitutionality of Tax Regulation of Activities of Religious Organizations
Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAULL. REV.1, 23-29 (1990).
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Another example comes from my hometown of Valparaiso
(Indiana, not Chile). Each Christmas season we have a live
nativity scene on the courthouse grounds which is entertaining
for the whole town, especially the children. Some local
residents dress up as Mary,Joseph, and the shepherds, and
there are often live sheep. I t gets pretty cold, so I don't think
they have a real child, but one year they brought in some
camels. Anyway, viewing this community celebration as
something that ought t o be protested seems to me
extraordinarily hypersensitive, if not small-hearted. Yet o u r
law would give such protesters strong b a ~ k i n g . ~
On the other hand, some events a t our town courthouse
seem much more offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities;
yet our law provides no remedy. A few years ago, we erected
what some people call the "Rusty Butterfly" in front of the
courthouse. It is a modern sculpture which probably does not
agree with the taste of a majority of the people of Valparaiso,
and they do not like the fact that public space and public funds
have been spent on a sculpture that is meaningless to them. (I
should say that I like it; so I'm not grinding my own axe here.)
Furthermore, these townspeople are offended by the fact that
the sculpture replaced a war memorial. Something quite dear
to the hearts of those people whose relatives had died in the
First World War was replaced by the Rusty Butterfly. But this
intrusion into the public realm of an idiosyncratic aesthetic
value, of a particular personal preference for a modern
sculpture over a war memorial, is not actionable in the courts.
Now, why should we be so sensitive to people who are upset by
the nativity scene and not to those upset by the sculpture? This
position of our law strikes me prima facie as accidental. I t does
not make sense, if one were designing a polity from scratch, to
purposely draw such a line.
Perhaps this strange stance is the result of an accident of
incorporation, the Supreme Court's decision to read the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth. Mary AM Glendon and Raul
Yanes argued recently that the incorporation cases were not
well thought out.9 They imply that if the Court had been more
reflective, it might have incorporated the Establishment Clause

8.
9.

See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.573 (1989).
Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L.

REV. 477, 479-92 (1991).
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differently.1° Here, in my opinion, is a more reasonable
version of incorporation: The Clause providing that Congress
may make no law respecting an establishment of religion was
originally intended not only to exclude a federal establishment
of religion, but also to forbid federal interference with the
various establishments of religion that were then in place a t
the state level." The Framers did not mean to articulate the
principles of a polity but rather, in many ways, the principles
of an international treaty. The real foundations of common life,
including religion, were left to the several states. Now, it seems
to me that when the Establishment Clause was incorporated,
the state~localrelationship should simply have replaced the
federdstate relationship. Thus no state should be able to
establish or favor a particular religion. But just as the federal
government, at the time of the First Amendment's ratification,
had to respect state establishments of religion, state
governments should now likewise have to respect towns and
other local communities that have a religious identity.
Religiously expressive communities should be able to
participate in public programs, receive public benefits, and
have their symbols part of a public holiday display, as long as
there is no pattern of official state preference for one particular
religion.12 But the Court missed its chance to adopt this better
theory of incorporation.
Did our hostility to public religion really have to happen?
Another thought experiment illustrates the seemingly
accidental nature of Establishment doctrines. Assume the
Framers had been truly farsighted and had realized that in the
twentieth century our strongest passion would not be religion
but sport. They might have drafted the First Amendment to
read, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of sport." (The words of the Free Exercise Clause could have
remained almost the same as they are now, but they would
10. Id. at 481.
11. See id. at 482.
12.
This proposal may seem akin to Professor Worthen's suggestion that the
Constitution ought to apply differently to local institutions than to state or
national institutions. See Kevin J Worthen, The Role of Local Governments in
Striking the Proper Balance Between Individualism and Communitarianism: Lessons
for and from Americans, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 475, 490. My argument is, however,
restricted to the Establishment Clause. After incorporation, localities could not
claim any special protection from the free speech part of the First Amendment, in
my view, because the original unincorporated First Amendment did not in itself
provide any protection for states which limited speech.
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have guaranteed "the right to exercise freely.") Courts might
later have created a high and impregnable wall of separation
between sport and state. Such a legal setup could have given
rise to genuinely perceived injuries and conflicts. I suppose
some Californians would be upset with the current mayor of
San Francisco. How dare he try to float public bond issues and
do other favors for the Giants in order to keep them in San
Francisco?13 Such actions are none of his business. And what
about fairness to basketball fans? Some nonsporty types might
even get annoyed when the President of the United States
throws out a baseball .to start the season. Is he trying to say
that baseball is the national pastime?
I am serious in my attempt at humor because I do think
we are conditioned, as Mary Ann Glendon puts it, by "the
stories told by the law."14 If the law tells us that we should be
offended in certain circumstances, then some of us will discover
that we are offended. We all have so many resentments against
others-against anything that intrudes upon our preferencesthat if we are told that a particular intrusion is illegitimate, we
fight back. But what the law tells us may sometimes be a
historical accident.
111. A RATIONAL FOUNDATION
FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENTDOCTRINE
Professor Durham is also correct, however, in pointing out
that some tension between religion and secularity is universal,
a t least in the modern world.15 Perhaps the language of the
law is only the occasion, rather than the deep cause, of our
current hostility toward "establishing" religion. Perhaps the
'law's stories" are simply a match tossed into an already
flammable public consciousness.
Professor Durham argues that one underlying reason for
sacred-secular tensions is a project of the Enlightenment.16
Enlightened modernity has sought to give final form t o the first
of the two ways of thinking with which Professor Durham

13. See Hank Hersch, Tale of Four Cities: For Giants Fans in Two Bay Areas,
It Is the Best of Times, It Is the Worst of Times, SPoffTs ILLUSPRATED, Aug. 24,
1992, at 24.
14. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTIONAND DIVORCEIN WESTERN LAW 8-9
(1987).
15. Durham & Dushku, supra note 1, at 425, 426-37.
16. See id. at 443-44.
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begins his paper. It has sought to construct a universally
convincing, scientific, political rationality that would maximize
the values of efficiency, national unity, and private freedom.''
Here I must disagree on one point with Professor Durham
and with others whose work I otherwise admire. I do not think
the purpose of the Establishment Clause can be limited just to
protecting free exercise of religion.'' If a religion were
established, it could interfere with our lives in many
nonreligious ways. If a vegetarian religion were enforced, I
could no longer eat meat. My religion does not necessarily tell
me to eat meat, but maybe I like meat or I think my children
need protein in the form of meat to stay healthy. So the
Establishment Clause can easily be seen as part of a broader
project of excluding religion from public life in order to base
lawmaking on rational, universally acknowledged principles. If
the irrationalities and traditions of religion are kept out,
private freedom will not be unnecessarily restricted. The
problem is that this supposed universally convincing rationality
does not convince religious adherents. Because they persist in
asserting backward, unreasonable beliefs, they must somehow
be walled out of the public forum. Since religious adherents
cannot be rationally persuaded, they must be delegitimated.
Some ad horninem argument must provide a reason why the
rest of us who are engaged in this enlightened project do not
have to listen to them and certainly do not have to take into
account their views and votes.
I spent a month in Nepal this past year, and the new
constitution of that country shows that this same process has
Alasdair Mdntyre puts the matter this way:
It was a central aspiration of the Enlightenment, an aspiration the
formulation of which was itself a great achievement, to provide for debate
in the public realm standards and methods of rational justification by
which alternative courses of action in every sphere of life could be
adjudged just or unjust, rational or irrational, enlightened or
unenlightened. So, it was hoped, reason would displace authority and
tradition. Rational justification was to appeal to principles undeniable by
any rational person and therefore independent of all those social and
cultural particularities which the Enlightenment thinkers took to be the
mere accidental clothing of reason in particular times and places. And
that rational justification could be nothing other than what the thinkers
of the Enlightenment had said that it was came to be accepted, at least
by the vast majority of educated people, in post-Enlightenment cultural
and social orders.
ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, WHOSEJUSMCE?WHICHRATIONAL^? 6 (1988).
18. But cf. Durham & Dushku, supra note 1, at 459-60.

17.
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recently taken place there. A few years ago, the united forces of
the liberals and the leftists nearly overthrew the monarchy.''
To avoid a complete revolution and preserve himself, the king
simply made a deal with these two groups. The leaders of the
liberals, leftists, and monarchists negotiated a new
constitution; no constituent assembly was ever elected to
express the views of the people as a whole. What the three
bargaining parties agreed upon included a democratic,
constitutional monarchy and national unity. To these ends,
they inserted in the constitution a rule that no political party
may be based, inter alia, on religion, tribe, or regioa20 Of
course, those are the loyalties closest to Nepalese hearts; they
were excluded, I think, because they were thought to interfere
with unity and efficiency.
NATUREOF THIS RATIONALITY
IV. THEACCIDENTAL
Let us return to the question of whether it is rational to
tolerate the Rusty Butterfly but not the live nativity scene. The
deep purpose of the latter intolerance, I submit, is to
delegitimate religious arguments and to make it clear that
those arguments do not require attention, that they have no
public force, that they may not be aired in a public space.
Permitting the government to endorse religion, even in a
symbolic, noncoercive way, is to give religion public legitimacy,
and who knows where that will lead? The nativity scene has to
be removed, not because it causes more grievous harm than
other public value choices, but because of the supposed rational
need to delegitimate religion.
I wonder, however, whether much that passes for
rationality is not itself transitory, an accident of history. After
all, the Enlightenment's project has failed.21 The idea of
developing a universally valid normative science of society, if i t
was ever persuasive, is not so anymore. Few of us (at least
outside of law and economics) think that neutral, foundational
assumptions still exist upon which all reasonable persons of
good will can agree and upon the basis of which all problems

19. For general background, see RISWKESHSHAHA,POLITICS
IN NEPAL: 19801990 (1990).
20. CONST.OF THE KINGDOM OF NEPAL
2047 art. 112(3) (1990); see a k o Michael
Hutt, Drafting the Nepal Constitution, 1990, 31 ASIAN SURV.1020, 1028, 1037
(1991).
21. See generally MAcINTYRE,supra note 17.
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can be rationally solved. Hence there is no longer a principled
argument for the exclusion of religion. There was once a
respectable project which made it right to exclude religion from
the public sphere, but most of us have given up on that
project.22
The skepticism that was used t o undermine religion and to
clear the way for the rational legislator, at the time of the
Enlightenment and thereafter, has now turned back on law and
on reason itself. Postmodern skepticism destroys the bright line
between the rational and the religious, while undermining any
new values we might wish 'to cheer. Witness the theoretical
tension between proponents of minority rights or the rights of
women and movements like Critical Legal S t ~ d i e s . ~ ~
Postmodern thought conflicts as much with any sort of
objective ideal o r principle as it does with religious
Since we are all in the same postmodern boat now, there is
no good reason why religion should continue to be treated as an
especially irrational and embarrassing part of life. We are all
equally naked and vulnerable. To continue to taint religion is
purely a political privileging. There is no longer a credible
metatheory available that explains why religion should be
excluded while feminism or some other doctrine is included in
public life. The time has come t o stop pretending that there are
a priori reasons why we do not have to listen to each other.

22. John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin are two prominent scholars still seeking
rationally to disenfranchise certain values and worldviews. They have not
succeeded. See Richard Stith, A Critique of Fairness, 16 VAL. U . L. REV. 459
(1982);Richard Stith, WiU There Be a Science of Law in the Twenty-First Century?,
22 REV. GI~N.373 (1991), regarding Rawls and Dworkin respectively.
23. For a description of this tension and an attempt to lessen it, see Dennis
Patterson, PostmodemismlFeminism/Law, 77 CORNELLL. REV.254 (1992).
24.
Michael Peny now appears to take this position. Although he had
previously argued otherwise, he recently stated, ''Now I see no good reason to
exclude any religious beliefs as a basis for a political choice. . . . [Clontroversial
religious beliefs do not have a different, much less an inferior, epistemological
status from controversial beliefs of other sorts . . . ." Michael J. Peny, The
Inclusivist Ideal in Political Choice, WOODSTQCK
REP., Mar. 1993, at 7, 8.

